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Among the more significant cases discussed herein are two Court
of Appeals decisions: Parke-Bernet v. Franklyn and Granite Worsted
Mills v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd. The former apparently marks the end
of judicial entanglement with technical rules of agency when jurisdiction is predicated under the long-arm statute. The latter seemingly
heralds the beginning of speculative scrutiny of an arbitrator's award.
Finally, special attention must be given to the arguments advanced in Lawson v. Mantell, which is reported under article 71.
There, the replevin provision contained in CPLR 7102 withstood
constitutional attack in the face of allegations that it violated the
due process and equal protection clauses. Nevertheless, immediately
prior to publication, a federal court held that the section is violative
of due process requirements. Further analysis of this area can be
expected in future issues of the Survey.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's procedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less
important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included.
While few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey
accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in
the cases are listed under their respective titles.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Further construction of the words "in person,"
"through an agent," and "transacts business."
Almost since its inception, the purpose of CPLR 302(a)(l) 1 has
been, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "to take advantage of
the 'new [jurisdictional] enclave' . . . opened up by International
Shoe where the nonresident defendant has engaged in some purposeful activities in the state." 2 Nevertheless, in enacting this section,
the legislature chose not to fix precise standards as to the minimal
contacts required to sustain jurisdiction.3 Two recent cases, in an
attempt to clarify the factual prerequisites to the assertion of long1 CPLR 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who in
person or through an agent "transacts any business within the state."
2 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 456-57,
209 N.E.2d 68, 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18 (1964).
3 Id. at 456, 209 N.E.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
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arm jurisdiction, have focused on three elements of CPLR 302(a)(1)
which have created difficulties of interpretation in the past: the meaning of the words "in person," 4 the character of the agency relationship,5 and the nature of the business that must be transacted. 6
Transaction of Business "in Person"
In Parke-Bernet v. Franklyn7 the defendant, a California resident, participated in an art auction held in New York via telephone
from his home state. Pursuant to his request, the defendant was assigned an employee of the art gallery to relate the progress of the
auction and enter bids on his behalf. As a result of this arrangement,
the defendant successfully bid $96,000 for two paintings, but subsequently refused to pay for them. Thereupon, plaintiff commenced
an action in New York by personally serving the defendant in California.
Under these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the telephone
contact was enough to establish that defendant had personally transacted business in New York. For, these activities constituted more
than the simple placing of an order by telephone; 8 "in a very real
sense, [they] projected [the defendant] into the auction room to
compete with the other purchasers . . . there." 9 And, through his
active participation in the auction, defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of New York's laws
relating to the conduct of auctions.' 0
Transaction of Business "Through an Agent"
Although other cases have held that a party need not be actually
present in the state" and that a single act 12 may have jurisdictional
consequences, the ruling that defendant had personally transacted
4 Compare Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965)
with Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 355, 297 N.Y.S.2d
985 (1st Dep't 1969), aff"d, 26 N.Y.2d 280, 258 N.E.2d 202, 309 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1970). See
generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 128-33 (1965).
5 See, e.g., Elman v. Belson, 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969);
A. Millner Co. v. Noudar LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Ist Dep't 1966);
Schneider v. J & C Carpet Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1965).
6 See Chunky v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
726 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970), rev'g 31 App. Div. 2d 276,
297 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1969).
8 See, e.g., Katz & Son Billiard Prods. v. Correale & Sons, 2a N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d
864, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967).
926 N.Y.2d at 18, 256 N.E.2d at 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
10 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
i1 See, e.g., Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
12 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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business in the state is indeed a novel determination. Yet, the Court's
alternate holding that the defendant had also acted through an agent
in this state will probably become more renowned since it repudiates
those lower-court cases which have insisted upon a technically perfect
agency, 13 before permitting the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction.
Indeed, the appellate division's holding in Parke-Bernet that there
must be proof that the agent was "acting for the defendant alone,
solely in his interest and subservient to his wishes"' 4 is indicative
of this trend. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals established that
a technically perfect agency is not required, at least in that instance
where a third person, rather than the agent himself, is suing the principal. 15 Moreover, in the Court's opinion, to say that plaintiff's employee acted solely as its agent "ignores the realities of what he actually did." 6
The Nature of the "Business"
In evaluating cases involving separation agreements, the courts
have posited that "business" means commercial business. 1 7 Although
there have been many deviations from this approach,' 8 they have
been based on the commercial aspects of a separation agreement,
rather than the validity of the principle itself. It remains to be determined what effect the holding in Parker v. Rogerson0 will have
on this commercial-noncommercial business dichotomy. In Parker,
the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, upheld jurisdiction over
the donees of a gift in an action for the settlement of an estate with
the following statement: "It is undisputed that these defendants . ..
met with [Rogerson] in New York City for the purpose of arranging
a gift to them of some of the shares . . . the shares were . . .held
[in New York] for the benefit of these defendants." 20
13 See, e.g., Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783
(1968); A. Millner Co. v. Noudar LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Ist Dep't

1966).
14 31 App. Div. 2d 276, 278, 297 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (1st Dep't 1969).
18 Compare Elman v. Belson, 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969)
with Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968).
16 26 N.Y.2d at 19, 256 N.E.2d at 509, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
17 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Whitaker, 56 Misc. 2d 625, 289 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1968) (dictum); Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1964).
18 See, e.g., Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.YS.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966); Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1966) (dictum); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966) (dictum).
19 33 App. Div. 2d 284, 307 N.Y.S.2d 986 (4th Dep't 1970).
20 d. at 292, 307 N.Y.S.2d 994-95.
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The decision in Parker is not beyond criticism. In New York,
the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA) confers jurisdiction over
the recipient of a bequest from an estate2 1 and was intended to fill
in specific gaps left by CPLR 302.22 If, as the Fourth Department
has held, 302 is broad enough to encompass gifts, why was the SCPA
23
provision needed?
In any event, before the requirement of commerciality can be
disposed of, further analysis is needed.
CPLR 302(a)(4): Jurisdiction predicated upon ownership of property
before cause of action accrued.
Under CPLR 302(a)(4), a nondomiciliary may be subjected to
personal jurisdiction in New York if he owns, uses or possesses any
real property in the state. Although the jurisdictional possibilities
under this subsection are potentially broad, 24 there have been only
a few cases to base jurisdiction under it. 25 Nevertheless, it has been

held that at the time of service the defendant need not have any
interest in the realty; it is sufficient if jurisdiction is grounded in "the
relationship existing between the defendant and the realty

.

.

.

at

' 26
the time the cause of action accrues.
In Karrat v. Merhib,27 the plaintiff sued to recover brokerage
commissions due under a contract for the sale of property in New
York. In opposition, the defendants asserted that the cause of action
accrued subsequent to the disposition of the property and, therefore,
jurisdiction could not be predicated upon CPLR 302(a)(4). Nonetheless, the court ruled that by their ownership and sale of the land,
28
the defendants had transacted business in the state.
21 SuRR. CT. PROC. Aar § 210(2)(b) (McKinney 1967).

22 58A McKINNEY'S SURR. CT. PROC. Acr 210, commentary at 290 (1967).

23 The SCPA provision has been said to include gifts causa mortis if the disposition
of decedent's property came under the surrogate court's jurisdiction. Id., commentary
at 296. Thus, in Parker, this line of reasoning might have been followed to secure
jurisdiction over the donees for the Chautauqua County Surrogate's Court.
24 CPLR 302(a)(4) covers any interest in real property: fee, leasehold or easement.
1 WK&M
302.12. The only limitation appears to be that the cause of action must be
reasonably related to the property. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 433-34
(1963).
25 See Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1965); Hempstead Medical Arts Co. v. Mille, 150 N.Y.L.J. 111, Dec. 9, 1963, at 18, col. 6
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
26 Tebedo v. Nye, 45 Misc. 2d 222, 223, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1965).
27 62 Misc. 2d 72, 307 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1970).
28 But see Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783
(1969).

